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OVERRULED BY IMPLICATION 
Bradley Scott Shannon† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly stated that it 
reserves the exclusive “right” to overrule its own precedents.1  This 
proposition, as far as it goes, seems fairly unproblematic, as the concept 
of vertical stare decisis is well established in American jurisprudence.2  
Thus, though some have suggested that lower courts should have some 
ability to disregard Supreme Court precedent,3 most would agree that 
mere disagreement with a prior decision, a belief that a case was wrongly 
decided, a sense that a case would be decided differently if decided to-
day, or even a thought that, for reasons independent of any decision, a 
holding is likely to be overruled are insufficient reasons for disregarding 
superior court precedent.4 
                                                 
† Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law.  I thank my good friend Eric Hultman, 
who was at least willing to read this thing.  I also thank the editors of the Seattle University Law 
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 1. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989).  A court may be said to “overrule” a precedent when one of its holdings, or some portion 
thereof, is irreconcilably inconsistent with an earlier holding, or some portion thereof.  The effect of 
such an overruling is that the later holding, rather than the earlier, becomes binding law for that court 
and those obliged to follow it, at least until the more recent holding is itself overruled or otherwise 
abrogated.  See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 
1090 n.447 (2005) (“Case B can be thought of as overruling Case A if a holding of Case B and a 
holding of Case A are inconsistent.”).  For more on the nature and practice of overruling, see infra 
Parts II.A, III.C. 
 2. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (1994) (“[L]ongstanding doctrine dictates that a court is always bound to 
follow a precedent established by a court ‘superior’ to it.”)  Where the “superior” court is the Su-
preme Court and the precedent involves the making or interpretation of federal law, “subordinate” 
courts include not only lower federal courts, but also state courts.  See id. at 825. 
 3. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 
AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 4. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (“[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within 
the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no 
matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.”); C. Steven Bradford, Follow-
ing Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court’s Ill-Advised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 
FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 83 (1990) (“A lower court clearly violates its duty of allegiance to the Su-
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A different problem arises when two or more Supreme Court pre-
cedents seem to conflict.  What if an apparently relevant precedent has 
been eroded by one or more later decisions?  One might expect that, in 
the event of irreconcilable conflict, the more recent precedent would con-
trol.5  Yet, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,6  
the Court stated: “If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a 
case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of deci-
sions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly con-
trols, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own deci-
sions.”7  This statement is troublesome in that it has caused lower courts 
to follow Supreme Court precedent that has not yet been expressly over-
ruled, but has been overruled by implication.  This Article shows that this 
statement need not be followed—and indeed, if lower courts are to faith-
fully comply with their duties under vertical stare decisis, it must not be 
followed. 
The next Part of this Article begins with a discussion of the Su-
preme Court’s longstanding practice of overruling by implication, and it 
provides as an example the Court’s implicit overruling of its holding in 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States.8  Part II also shows that, notwith-
                                                                                                             
preme Court when, simply because the lower court feels the earlier Supreme Court decision was 
analytically wrong, it rejects a precedent that the Supreme Court has not questioned.”); Evan H. 
Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmak-
ing, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994) (“[T]he overwhelming consensus reflected by judicial and academic 
discourse holds that lower courts ought to define the law merely by interpreting existing precedents, 
without considering what their higher courts would likely do on appeal.”). 
 The aforesaid court practices should be distinguished from those situations in which a party 
urges the overruling of some precedent it acknowledges to be binding, a practice generally regarded 
as legitimate.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (approving (by implication) of “a nonfrivolous argument 
for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law”).  Also distinguish-
able are those instances in which lower courts follow superior court precedent, though criticize the 
same in dicta, another practice that seems to be regarded as legitimate.  See Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 
A Trial Judge’s Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1299 (1952) (“Where the 
precedent has not been impaired, the balance is in favor of the trial judge following it in his decree 
and respectfully stating in his accompanying opinion such reservations as he has. . . . [T]he reserva-
tion in the opinion promotes the growth of the law in the court where it most counts.  For if the criti-
cism of the precedent be just, the appellate court will set matters straight, and any trial judge worthy 
of his salt will feel complimented in being reversed on a ground he himself suggested.”).  For more 
on the nature and use of dicta in judicial opinions, see infra Part III.A. 
 5. See supra note 1.  See also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, 
the Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 972 (2000) 
(discussing the “seemingly uncontroversial . . . power of lower court judges to conclude that a Su-
preme Court precedent has been undermined by later decisions to the point that it has been implicitly 
overruled by the Court itself, and is therefore no longer binding.”).  Of course, if what seems to be a 
conflict can be reconciled, the lower court would apply the more relevant precedent, regardless of 
age. 
 6. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 7. Id. at 484. 
 8. 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
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standing the overruling of Almendarez-Torres, lower courts continue to 
follow that precedent, largely because of Rodriquez de Quijas.  Part III of 
this Article consists of a criticism of the Court’s statement in Rodriguez 
de Quijas.  Part III shows that this statement is dicta and therefore need 
not be followed by any lower court.  Part III further shows that even if 
regarded as somehow binding on lower courts, the Court’s statement in 
Rodriguez de Quijas has itself been overruled by implication, thereby 
obligating the lower courts to disregard contrary authority.  Finally, Part 
III shows that the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas should be 
expressly overruled, both because it fails to survive the Court’s own test 
for assessing the viability of precedent and because an express overruling 
would more clearly indicate that the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de 
Quijas cannot be read as impeding the lower courts’ ability to resolve 
precedential conflicts.  This Article concludes that, regardless of whether 
the Court expressly overrules Rodriguez de Quijas, lower courts must 
disregard the Court’s statement in that case and consider themselves free 
to recognize when cases, such as Almendarez-Torres, have been over-
ruled by implication. 
II.  THE PRACTICE OF OVERRULING BY IMPLICATION AND THE PROBLEM 
CREATED BY RODRIGUEZ DE QUIJAS 
A.  The General Concept of Overruling by Implication 
Though lower federal courts, as well as state courts, are obligated to 
follow Supreme Court precedent on matters of federal law,9 the Supreme 
Court itself is not so bound.  Rather, the Supreme Court has the power to 
overrule its own precedent10 and has in fact overruled precedent on many 
occasions.11  When the Supreme Court does overrule precedent, it often 
does so expressly.12  In that situation, lower courts are obliged to follow 
                                                 
 9. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 10. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (observing that 
“it is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command’”).  Though the 
Court acts as though it is somewhat constrained in its ability to overrule precedent (see infra Part 
III.C), there is little doubt that it has the ability to do so, at least under certain circumstances. 
 11. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (observing that “the Court has 
during the past 20 Terms overruled in whole or in part 33 of its previous constitutional decisions”).  
This is not a new phenomenon.  See, e.g., William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV.  
735, 743 (1949) (“In the period from 1937-March 28, 1949, the Court in 30 cases overruled earlier 
decisions.”).  Some place the total count at more than 200.  See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND 
INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 108-17, 2387−99 (2002). 
 12. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 
(1989) (“For all of these reasons, therefore, we overrule the decision in Wilko.”).  See also Shalala v. 
Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000) (“This Court does not normally over-
turn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority sub silentio.”). 
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the overruling decision.13  But the Supreme Court sometimes overrules 
prior holdings only by implication.14  As the Court stated more than a 
century ago: “Even if it were true that the decision referred to was not in 
harmony with some of the previous decisions, we had supposed that a 
later decision in conflict with prior ones had the effect to overrule them, 
whether mentioned and commented on or not.”15  Thus: “Although a 
lower court is bound by a prior decision of a higher court until that deci-
sion is overruled, there are circumstances in which a prior decision will 
be overruled implicitly rather than explicitly.  A lower court is not bound 
to follow a decision that has been implicitly overruled.”16 
Therefore, it should be apparent that no special language is neces-
sary to overrule a prior decision; the simple existence of some later, irre-
concilably inconsistent holding by the same court is sufficient.17  Indeed, 
it does not seem particularly important whether the later court intended 
to overrule its prior holding or whether it was even aware that it was do-
ing so.18  Thus, at the Supreme Court level, precedent—to the extent it 
                                                 
 13. See Bradford, supra note 4, at 83 (“If the later Supreme Court decision expressly overrules 
the earlier case, unquestionably the lower court should follow the latest pronouncement.  Rejection 
of the precedent that the Supreme Court has itself overruled is not infidelity to the higher court.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) (recognizing the implicit overruling 
of Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), by 
the Court in Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)); Steven G. Calabresi, Text vs. Prece-
dent in Constitutional Law, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 947, 953 (2008) (arguing that in Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court implicitly overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896)). 
 15. Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129, 131−32 (1888).  Accord John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 759 n.5 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine [of stare decisis] 
should not prevent us from acknowledging when we have already overruled a prior case, even if we 
failed to say so explicitly at the time.”). 
 16. 18 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.05[6], at 134−46 (3d ed. 
2008).  See also Hugh Baxter, Managing Legal Change: The Transformation of Establishment 
Clause Law, 46 UCLA L. REV. 343, 445−46 (1998) (“Deciding that the Supreme Court’s own cases 
implicitly have overruled an earlier precedent defers to, rather than defies, the Court’s authority.”). 
 17. Conversely, the mere inclusion of language in a Court’s opinion that “Case A is hereby 
overruled,” if not supported by a holding to that effect, would not, in fact, result in the overruling of 
Case A.  This is but a corollary of the larger notion that, with respect to precedent, a holding is bind-
ing, whereas dicta is not.  See infra Part III.A. 
 18. See Maurice Kelman, The Force of Precedent in the Lower Courts, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 3, 
24 (1967) (“Whichever circumstance accounts for the non-citation, it is generally advisable that the 
lower courts give effect to the principle expressed in the latest decision.”); Pintip Hompluem Dunn, 
Note, How Judges Overrule: Speech Act Theory and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 
493, 520 (2003) (“Even when a case does not intend to perform the act of overruling, future cases 
may deem that the case has done so, when viewing the case retrospectively.  In other words, the 
Justices may choose to overrule a case simply by stating that the case has already been overruled.”).  
In spite of the foregoing, Dunn argues 
[t]his is not to confuse when the act of overruling actually takes place.  As the Court ex-
plained in Hohn v. United States, “Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see 
fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about 
their continuing vitality.”  Thus, a case is not overruled until we can point to that single, 
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exists—may be either followed, distinguished, or overruled.  There are 
no other choices.19  Though it might be possible for a Court to be igno-
rant of or even to consciously disregard relevant precedent, the resulting 
holding, unless distinguishable, must be seen as overruling the earlier 
precedent.20  If that result was unintended or mistaken, it may of course 
be corrected in the future, in that the implicit overruling may itself be 
overruled.  But until that time, the later decision must control—the two 
conflicting precedents cannot co-exist.21 
Some have criticized the practice of overruling by implication,22 
and certainly, express overruling has some advantages.  For one thing, 
express overruling more clearly informs the consumers of judicial deci-
sions that a prior precedent is no longer good law.23  Express overruling 
                                                                                                             
identifiable utterance in which the Court intends the act of overruling.  To hold otherwise 
would violate one of the felicity conditions of the act of ruling—namely, that the author 
of an opinion must intend for the performative act to take place.  Rather, an utterance that 
implies that a case has been overruled previously is simply a justification for the explicit 
act that is currently being performed. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252−53 (1998)).  But there are 
at least two problems with this argument.  First, it relies on a case that in turn relied on Rodriguez de 
Quijas, see Hohn, 524 U.S. at 253, and to the extent the latter authority is weakened, this argument 
would seem to follow.  Second, though the Court presumably “intends” to decide a case however it 
decides it, and ought to know that its decision will likely have certain precedent-related effects, it 
does not necessarily follow, nor does it seem necessary, that the Court have “intended” those effects.  
Indeed, the full ramifications of its decisions are probably unknowable, in that they involve the be-
havior of an indeterminate number of other persons.  Cf. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 571, 576 (1987) (“[A] pure argument from precedent, unlike an argument from experience, 
depends only on the results of those decisions, and not on the validity of the reasons supporting 
those results.”). 
 19. See Schauer, supra note 18, at 594 n.47. 
 20. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and 
Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 98 n.119 (1991) (“Implicit overrulings and distinguishing cases 
differ in their respective practical effects: an implicitly overruled precedent no longer controls even 
the fact situation it initially purported to resolve, while a distinguished precedent at least retains 
sufficient vitality to resolve a fact situation identical to that which it originally settled.”).  
 21. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particu-
lar cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with each other, the 
Courts must decide on the operation of each.”).  See also Kelman, supra note 18, at 28 (“Absent a 
fair ground of logic or policy which serves to reconcile later with prior decisions, the lower courts 
should not shrink from declaring that an implied overruling has taken place and should in that event 
give full effect to the change.”). 
 22. One such scholar is Christopher J. Peters, who refers to this practice somewhat pejoratively 
as “under-the-table overruling.”  Christopher J. Peters, Under-the-Table Overruling, 54 WAYNE L. 
REV.  1067, 1068 (2008). 
 23. See Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 393 (2006) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (“It would be one thing if the majority simply wanted to overrule Seminole Tribe altogether.  
That would be wrong, but at least the terms of our disagreement would be transparent.  The major-
ity’s action today, by contrast, is difficult to comprehend.”); Douglas, supra note 11, at 749 (“[I]t 
would be wise judicial administration when a landmark decision falls to overrule expressly all the 
cases in the same genus as the one which is repudiated, even though they are not before the Court.  
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also might cause the issuing court to more carefully consider whether 
overruling is truly appropriate (or to at least articulate those considera-
tions expressly).24  Indeed, it might well be that reasons supporting ex-
press overruling outweigh those favoring overruling by implication. 
But, while there might be normative concerns with overruling by 
implication, there do not appear to be any legal impediments to the use 
of this practice—i.e., there does not seem to be anything unconstitutional 
about it, and neither Congress nor the Court itself has repudiated this 
practice.25 
Moreover, a consistent practice of express overruling, even if pref-
erable, is not as easy as it might sound.  For one thing, a serious com-
                                                                                                             
There is candor in that course.  Stare decisis then is not used to breed the uncertainty which it is 
supposed to dispel.”).  See also Gerhardt, supra note 20, at 98 n.119 (“Sometimes the Court can 
cause confusion when the Court does not make clear whether it is distinguishing or implicitly over-
ruling precedent.”); Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Ac-
tion by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 57 n.22 (1982) (“Lower court 
judges have disagreed at times as to whether implied overruling has in fact occurred.”).  Of course, 
one might keep in mind that “[e]ven an explicit overruling may be difficult to perceive.”  Id. 
 Professor Peters describes this phenomenon in somewhat different terms.  He states that “if the 
[Supreme] Court announces in an opinion that it is overruling a constitutional precedent, most Amer-
icans will assume that it has in fact overruled a precedent; but if the Court does not announce that it 
is overruling a precedent, most Americans will assume that it has not in fact done so.”  Peters, supra 
note 22, at 1090.  This statement is probably true, as is his statement that “most Americans’ primary 
source of information about the Court is the media’s reporting of what the Court says it does in its 
opinions.”  Id.  But it also seems true that, given the phenomenon of implicit overruling, one—at 
least if learned in the law—should not make this assumption.  In any event, all would probably agree 
that express overruling is at least somewhat more clear than implied. 
 24. As Hugh Baxter explains: 
Even in ordinary cases, the Court is expected to provide reasoned explanations for its de-
cisions.  This expectation increases with a decision to change the law, and particularly 
with a decision to overrule one of the Court’s precedents.  At least occasionally, this re-
quirement might deter an overruling or other change in the law.  In other cases, it leads 
the Court to take special care in constructing a plausible justification.  Even if not for-
mally enforceable against the Court, the requirement of reasoned explanation, like the 
norm of stare decisis, channels the course of the Court’s law-transforming strategies. 
Baxter, supra note 16, at 347 (footnotes omitted).  See also Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term 
Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 41 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that “sub silentio overruling” 
would “offend stare decisis principles”).  The stare decisis principles alluded to in these authorities 
are discussed in greater detail in Part III.C infra. 
 There might well be other advantages.  For example, Professor Peters argues that overruling by 
implication does more damage to the courts’ perceived legitimacy.  See Peters, supra note 22, at 
1079.  And of course, express overruling probably would avoid the problems currently associated 
with Rodriguez de Quijas.  But for the reasons stated in the main text, a complete discussion of the 
pros and cons of express versus implied overruling is unnecessary to the issues raised in this Article. 
 25. One might similarly observe that although it might be helpful if each act of Congress in-
cluded a provision explaining which statutes were being amended or repealed, there appears to be no 
constitutional or statutory requirement that it do so. 
 Having said that, it might well be that the Court at least purported to repudiate overruling by 
implication in Rodriguez de Quijas, though even if it did, the Court appears to have overruled itself.  
For a more complete discussion of this possibility, see infra Part III.B. 
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mitment to express overruling would require a search of the relevant re-
porters for any and all precedents contrary to any aspect of the holding of 
each later case.  Such a search, particularly considering the number of 
cases the Court might decide in any given year, seems impracticable.26  
And even when express overruling is utilized, a somewhat related prob-
lem arises.  Specifically, when the Court announces that one of its prior 
precedents has been overruled, it is probably the rare case in which every 
aspect of that prior holding is no longer good law.  More typically, a later 
Court will only be overruling certain aspects of a prior holding—crucial 
aspects, to be sure, but less than all.  Thus, though the Court typically 
announces overrulings without qualification,27 ideally it should be stating 
that it is overruling only those aspects of its prior holdings implicated by 
the current holding.  Though this too has been done on occasion (at least 
to some extent),28 it is probably asking too much to expect courts to per-
form this exercise in every situation in which it arises.  Overruling by 
implication avoids both of these problems (albeit by placing the burden 
of ascertaining the precise scope of a court’s precedents on future courts 
and litigants).  Thus, not only is overruling by implication permissible 
and done in fact, it also might be practically necessary, at least to some 
extent. 
                                                 
 26. See Kelman, supra note 18, at 17 (“For appellate courts in these circumstances to compile a 
list of each and every prior case killed off by the major new pronouncement is almost unheard of.  
To do so goes beyond the needs of the moment and can, it is assumed, be trusted to inference.”).  See 
also Kniffin, supra note 23, at 57 n.21 (“Higher courts rarely enumerate all the precedents over-
turned when a new principle is announced.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 
(1989). 
 28. One such example can be found in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), a case in 
which the Court considered the continuing vitality of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and 
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).  “Reconsidering these decisions now,” the Court 
ultimately concluded, “for the reasons heretofore stated, that they were wrongly decided and should 
be, and now are, overruled.”  Payne, 501 U.S. at 830.  But the Court then noted: 
Our holding today is limited to the holdings of [Booth and Gathers] that evidence and ar-
gument relating to the victim and the impact of the victim’s death on the victim’s family 
are inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing.  Booth also held that the admission of a 
victim’s family members’ characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, 
and the appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.  No evidence of the latter 
sort was presented at the trial in this case. 
Id. at n.2. 
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B.  A Case Study in Overruling by Implication: The Implicit Overruling 
of Almendarez-Torres v. United States 
Though examples of cases that have been overruled by implication 
are legion, one prominent, recent example can be found in Almendarez-
Torres v. United States.29 
Almendarez-Torres involved the determination of the elements of a 
crime with regard to the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.  It 
is established as a matter of federal constitutional law that the elements 
of a crime “must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and 
proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt.”30  The key ques-
tion in Almendarez-Torres related to the meaning of the term “element.”  
It has long been held that this term consists of “every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged,”31 and certainly, it in-
cludes what might be regarded as the “traditional” elements of a crime.32  
But does it include more?  Specifically, does the Constitution require the 
inclusion of elements beyond those “facts” more traditionally regarded as 
the elements of a crime? 
In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court addressed this question 
in connection with 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and the crime of Alien in the United 
States After Deportation.33  The “base” crime of Alien in the United 
States After Deportation, defined in § 1326(a), carries a maximum term 
of imprisonment of two years.34  Subsection 1326(b) then describes four 
                                                 
 29. 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
 30. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 232 (1999). 
 31. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 32. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.8(b), at 78 n.13 (2d ed. 2003)  
(defining “elements of a crime” as “its requisite (a) conduct (act or omission to act) and (b) mental 
fault (except for strict liability crimes)—plus often, (c) specified attendant circumstances, and some-
times, (d) a specified result of the conduct.”).  Today, most crimes are statutory, see id. § 2.1(a), at 
103, and typically, the statute defining the crime sets forth the elements of that crime.  But as the 
above definition indicates, more general principles of criminal law sometimes require the inclusion 
of elements beyond those expressly provided in the specific crime-defining statute.  Still, those addi-
tional, non-statutory elements will be regarded as “traditional” elements of that crime. 
 33. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226. 
 34. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006) currently provides: 
Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who— 
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has de-
parted the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal 
is outstanding, and thereafter 
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States, un-
less (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United States or his 
application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney 
General has expressly consented to such alien’s reapplying for admission; or 
(B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and removed, unless 
such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance con-
sent under this chapter or any prior Act, 
shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. 
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situations in which the maximum penalty for this crime may be in-
creased.  In particular, § 1326(b)(2) provides that a defendant “whose 
removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated 
felony” may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of up to twenty 
years.35  In a 5-4 decision, the Almendarez-Torres Court held that § 
1326(b)(2) “is a penalty provision, which simply authorizes a court to 
increase the sentence for a recidivist.  It does not define a separate crime.  
Consequently, neither the statute nor the Constitution requires the gov-
ernment to charge the factor that it mentions, an earlier conviction, in the 
indictment.”36  Thus, although the Almendarez-Torres Court acknowl-
edged that a prior conviction could be an element of a crime, so long as 
the relevant statute so required (in which case the usual constitutional 
protections would attach), it held, as a matter of statutory construction, 
that § 1326 was not such a statute and that the Constitution otherwise did 
not require the treatment of a “penalty provision” as an element.37 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Almendarez-Torres was short-
lived, though.  Just one year later, the Court decided Jones v. United 
States.38  The issue in Jones was whether a federal carjacking statute “de-
fined three distinct offenses or a single crime with a choice of three max-
imum penalties, two of them dependent on sentencing factors exempt 
from the requirements of charge and jury verdict.”39  The Court held that 
the statute defined three distinct offenses, in part to avoid “serious ques-
tions about the statute’s constitutionality.”40  Regarding the constitutional 
question, the Court described what was to become the standard: “[U]nder 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury 
trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact . . . that increases the 
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submit-
ted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”41 
                                                                                                             
Though the version of § 1326 at issue in Almendarez-Torres was amended after that decision, the 
changes were slight and do not affect the analysis here. 
 35. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (2006). 
 36. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226−27.  The Court’s opinion was delivered by Justice 
Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.  See id. 
at 226.  Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg 
joined.  See id. 
 37. See id. at 239.  It might be observed that, prior to Almendarez-Torres, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result and held that § 1326(b)(2) defined 
a separate crime.  See United States v. Gonzales-Medina, 976 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1992).  Indeed, 
a split among the circuits as to this issue appears to have led to the Court’s decision to consider the 
issue in Almendarez-Torres.  See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228. 
 38. 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 39. Id. at 229. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 243 n.6. 
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Though the majority in Jones attempted to distinguish the Court’s 
recent holding in Almendarez-Torres,42 the dissent was not convinced: 
First, the Court suggests that this case is “concerned with the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and not alone the rights to in-
dictment and notice as claimed by Almendarez-Torres.” This is not 
a valid basis upon which to distinguish Almendarez-Torres. . . . 
The Court has not suggested in its previous opinions . . . that 
there is a difference, in the context relevant here, between, on the 
one hand, a right to a jury determination, and, on the other, a right 
to notice by indictment and to a determination based upon proof by 
the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court offers no 
reason why the concept of an element of a crime should mean one 
thing for one inquiry and something else for another. . . .  
Second, the Court is eager to find controlling significance in the 
fact that the statute at issue in Almendarez-Torres made recidivism 
a sentencing factor, while the sentencing fact at issue here is serious 
bodily injury. This is not a difference of constitutional dimension, 
and Almendarez-Torres does not say otherwise. . . . 
. . . In sum, “there is no rational basis for making recidivism an 
exception.”43 
In 2000, in Apprendi v. New Jersey,44 the Court squarely addressed 
the constitutionality issue confronted in Jones.  In Apprendi, the defen-
dant was charged with possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, a 
crime that carried a term of imprisonment of up to ten years.45  But a 
separate statute, which applied when the underlying crime was commit-
ted “with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals 
because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or 
ethnicity,” extended the maximum term of imprisonment to twenty 
years.46  The question before the Apprendi Court was “whether the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual de-
termination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for 
an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof 
                                                 
 42. See id. at 248−49.  The Court relied primarily on the “tradition of regarding recidivism as a 
sentencing factor,” and the fact that a prior conviction “must itself have been established through 
procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.”  Id. at 249.  The 
Court further observed that Almendarez-Torres did not involve the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial, but rather only the “rights to indictment and notice.”  Id. at 248. 
 43. Id. at 268−70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 44. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 45. See id. at 468. 
 46. Id. at 468−69 (quoting N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000)). 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.”47  The Court’s answer to this question—
which was “foreshadowed by our opinion in Jones”—was yes.48  The 
Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”49 
As in Jones, the Apprendi Court distanced itself from its holding in 
Almendarez-Torres, which (it explained) was “at best an exceptional de-
parture from the historic practice that we have described.”50  The Court 
later added the following: 
Even though it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly 
decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should 
apply if the recidivist issue were contested, Apprendi does not con-
test the decision’s validity and we need not revisit it for purposes of 
our decision today to treat the case as a narrow exception to the 
general rule we recalled at the outset.  Given its unique facts, it 
surely does not warrant rejection of the otherwise uniform course of 
decision during the entire history of our jurisprudence.51 
Justice Thomas, in a concurrence joined in part by Justice Scalia, 
argued “that the Constitution requires a broader rule than the Court 
adopts.”52  Justice Thomas reiterated that the crucial question in this area 
is how to determine which facts constitute the elements of a crime.53  
And after reviewing “[a] long line of essentially uniform authority” on 
this subject, Justice Thomas—who was a member of the Almendarez-
Torres majority—concluded that this authority 
establishes that a “crime” includes every fact that is by law a basis 
for imposing or increasing punishment (in contrast with a fact that 
mitigates punishment). Thus, if the legislature defines some core 
crime and then provides for increasing the punishment of that crime 
upon a finding of some aggravating fact—of whatever sort, includ-
ing the fact of a prior conviction—the core crime and the aggravat-
                                                 
 47. Id. at 469. 
 48. Id. at 476. 
 49. Id. at 490.  In so holding, the Court clearly rejected the structural argument relied upon in 
part by the Almendarez-Torres majority.  See id. at 494 (“Despite what appears to us the clear ‘ele-
mental nature’ of the factor here, the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does the 
required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s 
guilty verdict?”).  Incidentally, the Court’s opinion, which was delivered by Justice Stevens, was 
joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg.  See id. at 468.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer dissented.  See id. 
 50. Id. at 487. 
 51. Id. at 489−90 (footnote omitted). 
 52. Id. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 53. See id. at 500. 
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ing fact together constitute an aggravated crime, just as much as 
grand larceny is an aggravated form of petit larceny.54 
Two years later, in Ring v. Arizona,55 the Court considered the ap-
plication of Apprendi to the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in 
capital proceedings.56  Specifically, Arizona had a scheme whereby the 
trial court judge, “following a jury adjudication of a defendant’s guilt of 
first-degree murder,” was permitted to determine “the presence or ab-
sence of the aggravating factors required by Arizona law for imposition 
of the death penalty.”57  The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by 
Justice Ginsburg, held that “[c]apital defendants, no less than noncapital 
defendants, . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which 
the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.”58 
Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by Justice Thomas, concurred: 
[A]s I wrote in my dissent in Almendarez-Torres, and as I reaf-
firmed by joining the opinion for the Court in Apprendi, I believe 
that the fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of 
punishment that the defendant receives—whether the statute calls 
                                                 
 54. Id. at 501. Justice Thomas also added: 
 The consequence of the above discussion for our decision[] in Almendarez-
Torres . . . should be plain enough, but a few points merit special mention. 
 First, it is irrelevant to the question of which facts are elements that legislatures 
have allowed sentencing judges discretion in determining punishment (often within ex-
tremely broad ranges). 
 . . . 
 Second, and related, one of the chief errors of Almendarez-Torres—an error to 
which I succumbed—was to attempt to discern whether a particular fact is traditionally 
(or typically) a basis for a sentencing court to increase an offender’s sentence.  For the 
reasons I have given, it should be clear that this approach just defines away the real issue.  
What matters is the way by which a fact enters into the sentence.  If a fact is by law the 
basis for imposing or increasing punishment—for establishing or increasing the prosecu-
tion’s entitlement—it is an element.  (To put the point differently, I am aware of no his-
torical basis for treating as a nonelement a fact that by law sets or increases punishment.)  
When one considers the question from this perspective, it is evident why the fact of a 
prior conviction is an element under a recidivism statute.  Indeed, cases addressing such 
statutes provide some of the best discussions of what constitutes an element of a crime.  
One reason frequently offered for treating recidivism differently, a reason on which we 
relied in Almendarez-Torres, is a concern for prejudicing the jury by informing it of the 
prior conviction.  But this concern, of which earlier courts were well aware, does not 
make the traditional understanding of what an element is any less applicable to the fact of 
a prior conviction. 
Id. at 518−21 (citations omitted). 
 55. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 56. See id. at 588. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 589.  Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined Justice Gins-
burg’s opinion.  See id. at 587.  Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor dissented from 
the Court’s judgment.  See id. 
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them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—
must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.59 
Justice Kennedy, though still of the view that Apprendi was 
“wrongly decided,” also concurred in the Court’s opinion because Ap-
prendi “is now the law, and its holding must be implemented in a princi-
pled way.”60  Finally, though Justice O’Connor dissented, even she ac-
knowledged that the rule articulated in Apprendi “directly contradicts 
several of our prior cases,” including Almendarez-Torres.61 
Just two years later, in Blakely v. Washington,62 the Supreme Court 
addressed the constitutionality of Washington’s sentencing guidelines.63  
Despite the fact that the term of imprisonment imposed did not exceed 
the statutory maximum for the crime at issue, the Court reversed the 
judgment of the Washington Court of Appeals.64  In so holding, the 
Court explained: 
Our precedents make clear . . . that the “statutory maximum” for 
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose 
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admit-
ted by the defendant.  In other words, the relevant “statutory maxi-
mum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after find-
ing additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any 
additional findings.65 
The Court then continued: 
Whether the judge’s authority to impose an enhanced sentence 
depends on finding a specified fact (as in Apprendi), one of several 
specified facts (as in Ring), or any aggravating fact (as here), it re-
mains the case that the jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the 
sentence. The judge acquires that authority only upon finding some 
additional fact. 
                                                 
 59. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 60. Id. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 619 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 62. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 63. According to the Blakely Court, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to the kidnapping of his estranged wife.  The facts admitted in his plea, 
standing alone, supported a maximum sentence of 53 months.  Pursuant to state law, the 
court imposed an “exceptional” sentence of 90 months after making a judicial determina-
tion that he had acted with “deliberate cruelty.”  We consider whether this violated [the 
defendant’s] Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 
Id. at 298 (citation omitted). 
 64. See id. at 314.  The Court’s opinion was delivered by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg.  See id. at 297. 
 65. Id. at 303−04 (citations omitted). 
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Because the State’s sentencing procedure did not comply with 
the Sixth Amendment, petitioner’s sentence is invalid.66 
In United States v. Booker67—which dealt with the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines—the Court again reaffirmed the Apprendi hold-
ing: “Any fact . . . which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the 
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury 
verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”68  More recently, in Cunningham v. California,69 the 
Court applied this rule to California’s determinate sentencing law.70 
Taken together, the preceding line of cases leads to two conclu-
sions.  First, the Court’s holding in Apprendi has been applied broadly 
and in a wide variety of contexts, to the point where the Court’s holding 
in Almendarez-Torres cannot fairly be reconciled with its holdings in 
similar cases decided since Almendarez-Torres.71 
                                                 
 66. Id. at 305 (footnote omitted).  See also id. at 328 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court makes 
clear that it means what it said in Apprendi.  In its view, the Sixth Amendment says that ‘any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to 
a jury.’”) (citation omitted) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 
 67. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 68. Id. at 244. 
 69. 549 U.S. 270 (2007). 
 70. See id. at 274.  The Cunningham majority consisted of the Apprendi majority plus Chief 
Justice Roberts.  See id. at 273.  Justice Alito, along with Justices Kennedy and Breyer, dissented.  
See id. 
 It must be conceded that, in Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009), the Supreme Court declined 
to extend its holding in Apprendi beyond the proposition stated above.  Instead, the Court held—in 
another 5-4 decision—that such considerations do not govern the decision whether a defendant con-
victed of multiple offenses may be given consecutive (rather than concurrent) sentences.  See id. at 
715.  But the Court has never retreated from its holding in Apprendi in any “offense-specific con-
text” and indeed recently reaffirmed that “it is within the jury’s province to determine any fact . . . 
that increases the maximum punishment authorized for a particular offense.”  Id. at 714. 
 71. See also Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subse-
quent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence . . . .”). 
 It is true that the Court has never directly confronted the issue of whether Almendarez-Torres 
survived Apprendi; if it had, there would be no dispute along these lines.  But as the Court itself has 
recognized, such a crabbed approach to precedent is not the law.  For example, in United States v. 
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), the Court recognized that one of its precedents, Sinclair v. United 
States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929), was  
not controlling in the strictest sense, since it involved the assertion of a Sixth Amendment 
right to have the jury determine, not ‘materiality’ under § 1001, but rather “pertinency” 
under that provision of Title 2 making it criminal contempt of Congress to refuse to an-
swer a “question pertinent to a question under congressional inquiry.” 
Id. at 519 (citation omitted).  Nonetheless, the Court concluded that “while Sinclair is not strictly 
controlling, it is fair to say that we cannot hold for respondent today while still adhering to the rea-
soning and the holding of that case.”  Id. at 519−20.  And so it is here. 
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Second, a majority of the members of the Court has rejected the 
reasoning in Almendarez-Torres.72  Almendarez-Torres was decided by a 
5-4 margin,73 and one member of the Almendarez-Torres majority, Jus-
tice Thomas, has since recanted and suggested that he would now vote 
with the dissent.74  Moreover, the remaining four members of the Almen-
darez-Torres majority have conceded that “‘there is no rational basis for 
making recidivism an exception’” in this context.75  Two of those justices 
have recognized that “Apprendi’s rule that any fact that increases the 
maximum penalty must be treated as an element of the crime . . . directly 
contradicts” the Court’s holding in Almendarez-Torres.76 
There is, therefore, little doubt that Almendarez-Torres has been 
overruled,77 at least by implication.78  Although the Court has not yet 
expressly overruled Almendarez-Torres, its holding in that case has been 
completely eviscerated to the point where it has been rendered irrecon-
cilably inconsistent with not one, but several subsequent holdings.  And 
there is no indication that the Court intends to retreat from its more re-
cent doctrine.79 
                                                 
 72. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 27 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (“[A] majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”). 
 73. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226 (1998). 
 74. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 520−21 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 75. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 270 (1999) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
and O’Connor and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 258 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
 76. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 619 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 77. Based on the discussion in Part II.A, supra, it would probably be more accurate to say that 
that portion of the holding in Almendarez-Torres case discussed herein has been overruled.  But this 
shorthand way of expressing overruling is commonly used, and will be used here. 
 78. The scholarly commentary supporting this proposition is overwhelming.  See, e.g., Colleen 
P. Murphy, The Use of Prior Convictions After Apprendi, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973, 979 (2004) 
(arguing that “the logic of Apprendi . . . indicate[s] that the Constitution guarantees jury determina-
tion, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the existence of a prior conviction”).  See also Brent E. Newton, 
Almendarez-Torres and the Anders Ethical Dilemma, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 747, 776−77 n.141 (2008) 
(collecting additional authorities). 
 79. Though several of the decisions in the Apprendi line have been close, the majority in each 
has been steadfast, and all of the Justices comprising those majorities remain on the Court.  More-
over, in Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009), Chief Justice Roberts (also a member of the Cunning-
ham majority) was willing to extend the reasoning in Apprendi to the consecutive sentence context 
(see 129 S. Ct. 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting)), strong evidence that he supports the less radical holding 
of Apprendi itself.  By contrast, two longstanding dissenters in this line of cases, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice O’Connor, are no longer with the Court.  And although Justice Alito agreed with 
the majority in Ice, so did Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, two long-time Apprendi supporters.  See 
id. at 714.  Thus, there is every indication that the Apprendi majority will continue to hold sway.  
Though future Court departures and additions obviously would change the dynamic to some degree, 
the minority viewpoint now bears the added burdens imposed by the doctrine of stare decisis.  See 
infra Part III.C (discussing stare decisis doctrine generally). 
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C.  The Lower Courts’ Failure to Recognize the Implicit Overruling of 
Almendarez-Torres 
Because Almendarez-Torres has so clearly been overruled, one 
would expect lower federal courts, as well as state courts, to disregard 
Almendarez-Torres and treat recidivism as an element of a crime wher-
ever appropriate.  Surprisingly, though, the results to date have been pre-
cisely the opposite; in fact, it is not even close.  Overwhelmingly, lower 
courts that have dealt with this issue post-Apprendi have held that Al-
mendarez-Torres continues to apply where recidivism is used to increase 
the maximum penalty for a crime.80 
There appear to be two main reasons why lower courts continue to 
follow the Supreme Court’s holding in Almendarez-Torres.81  First, 
courts continue to follow Almendarez-Torres because of the Court’s de-
cision in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.82  The 
precise issue before the Court in Rodriguez de Quijas was “whether a 
predispute agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 
is unenforceable, requiring resolution of the claims only in a judicial fo-
rum.”83  The district court had held that such claims were not subject to 
arbitration pursuant to the Court’s holding in Wilko v. Swan.84  However, 
the court of appeals reversed, “concluding that the arbitration agreement 
is enforceable because th[e Supreme] Court’s subsequent decisions have 
reduced Wilko to ‘obsolescence.’”85 
The Supreme Court, in substance, agreed with the court of appeals 
and held that “Wilko was incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with the 
prevailing uniform construction of other federal statutes governing arbi-
                                                 
 80. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 28 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“Innumerable criminal defendants have been unconstitutionally sen-
tenced under the flawed rule of Almendarez-Torres, despite the fundamental ‘imperative that the 
Court maintain absolute fidelity to the protections of the individual afforded by the notice, trial by 
jury, and beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirements.’”) (quoting Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 
545, 581−82 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting)); Newton, supra note 78, at 784 n.192 (“In the federal 
circuit courts alone, over 5,200 federal defendants have filed appeals ultimately seeking to have 
Almendarez-Torres overruled.”). 
 81. There might well be more.  For example, it might well be that some judges simply like, or 
prefer, the rule expressed in Almendarez-Torres.  Moreover, some might be concerned about the 
effect an overruling of Almendarez-Torres might have on the rate of reversals in criminal cases 
(including, perhaps, those involving collateral review), particularly post-Booker.  Nonetheless, this 
Article assumes that lower courts at least attempt to follow Supreme Court precedent regardless of 
any judge’s personal views or concerns. 
 82. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 83. Id. at 478. 
 84. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).  See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 479. 
 85. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 479 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman 
Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
2009] Overruled by Implication 167 
tration agreements in the setting of business transactions.”86  Accord-
ingly, the Court expressly overruled Wilko87 and ultimately affirmed the 
judgment of the court of appeals.88  Nonetheless, the Court added the 
following: 
We do not suggest that the Court of Appeals on its own authority 
should have taken the step of renouncing Wilko.  If a precedent of 
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on rea-
sons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals 
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court 
the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.89 
Second, lower courts continue to apply Almendarez-Torres because 
of language included in more recent Supreme Court decisions that sug-
gests that its holding in Almendarez-Torres retains some vitality.  Such 
language first appeared in Jones, wherein the Court, in its tentative, con-
stitutional definition of “element,” excluded prior convictions.90  Similar 
language has been included in several Supreme Court opinions since.91 
Although one cannot be certain why the Supreme Court included 
these statements in its opinions, in Rodriguez de Quijas, it seems fairly 
clear that the Court was concerned about the lower courts’ ability to cor-
rectly ascertain the nature and scope of seemingly conflicting Supreme 
                                                 
 86. Id. at 484. 
 87. See id. at 485. 
 88. See id. at 486. 
 89. Id. at 484.  Though four justices dissented, the dissent was, if anything, even more strident 
in its criticism of the court of appeals: 
The Court of Appeals refused to follow Wilko, a controlling precedent of this Court.  As 
the majority correctly acknowledges, the Court of Appeals therefore engaged in an inde-
fensible brand of judicial activism.  We, of course, are not subject to the same restraint 
when asked to upset one of our own precedents. 
Id. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).  The dissent went on to cite addi-
tional examples of “judicial activism” in the form of “numerous” district court decisions that simi-
larly “deviated from the rule established in Wilko.”  Id. at 486 n.1. 
 Incidentally, the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas (or versions thereof) has been re-
peated by the Supreme Court in several later cases, including State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 
(1997), and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997). 
 90. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999). 
 91. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  It might be observed, though, 
that this “prior conviction” exception was not mentioned in other discussions of this rule in later 
decisions.  See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 281 (2007) (“This Court has repeat-
edly held that, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential 
sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not mere-
ly by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 588, 589 (2002) (“Capital de-
fendants, no less than noncapital defendants, we conclude, are entitled to a jury determination of any 
fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.”).  Indeed, some 
of the cases in this line recite this rule both in this more general form and as supposedly qualified by 
Almendarez-Torres.  It is unclear why greater recognition has not been given to these more general 
statements and to this apparent contradiction. 
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Court precedents.92  As for the reason behind the prior conviction “ex-
ception,” in Jones, it might not yet have been entirely clear whether Jus-
tice Thomas was completely on board with a broader definition of “ele-
ment,” his recantation of his position in Almendarez-Torres not coming 
until later, in Apprendi.93  And as for why this language was repeated in 
Apprendi and certain later decisions, the most obvious explanation is that 
the Court was simply quoting Jones as written and without further reflec-
tion.  To the extent the Court thought about the inclusion of this language 
at all, it might have been because the precise issue in Almendarez-Torres 
has yet to be revisited,94 and though the Court presumably was aware of 
the scope of its holdings, it also was aware of the impact those decisions 
would have on the criminal law95 and might have been in no hurry to see 
those holdings fully implemented.  It also seems possible that, in some 
instances, this language was included by a justice who remains hostile to 
the new regime.96 
Regardless, as a result of these cases, every court of appeals that 
has considered this issue has held that Almendarez-Torres remains “good 
law.”97  Typical of such cases is United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda,98 
wherein the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit opined: 
                                                 
 92. A more detailed discussion of the various possible interpretations of this statement can be 
found in Part III.B infra. 
 93. See supra notes 52−54 and accompanying text. 
 94. See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4: 
Ring’s claim is tightly delineated: He contends only that the Sixth Amendment required 
jury findings on the aggravated circumstances asserted against him.  No aggravating cir-
cumstances related to past convictions in his case; Ring therefore does not challenge Al-
mendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which held that the fact of prior 
conviction may be found by the judge even if it increases the statutory maximum sen-
tence. 
 95. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 549−52 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 96. One possible example might be found in James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), 
wherein the Court (through Justice Alito) noted in dicta that it had “held that prior convictions need 
not be treated as an element of the offense for Sixth Amendment purposes.” James, 550 U.S. at 214 
n.8 (citing Almendarez-Torres).  Of course, it is not yet clear whether and to what extent Justice 
Alito will adhere to Apprendi; in Ice, he voted with the majority, but so did Justices Ginsburg and 
Stevens, both staunch Apprendi supporters.  Even Justice Alito’s dissent in Cunningham, see 550 
U.S. at 297, can be read as being consistent with the main thrust of Apprendi. 
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 255 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Gomez-
Estrada, 273 F.3d 400 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Anglin, 284 F.3d 407 (2d Cir. 2002); United 
States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 
2002); United States v. Barrera-Saucedo, 385 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Aparco-
Centeno, 280 F.3d 1084 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Morris, 293 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 
234 F.3d 411 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Cooper, 375 F.3d 1041 (10th Cir. 2004); and United 
States v. Marseille, 377 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 98. 234 F.3d 411 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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Because Apprendi preserves Almendarez-Torres as a “narrow ex-
ception” to Apprendi’s general rule, we can conclude, at most, that 
Apprendi casts doubt on the continuing viability of Almendarez-
Torres.  If the views of the Supreme Court’s individual Justices and 
the composition of the Court remain the same, Almendarez-Torres 
may eventually be overruled.  But such speculation does not permit 
us to ignore controlling Supreme Court authority.  Unless and until 
Almendarez-Torres is overruled by the Supreme Court, we must fol-
low it.99 
III.  A CRITIQUE OF RODRIGUEZ DE QUIJAS AND THE SUPREME COURT’S 
ATTEMPTED LIMITATION OF OVERRULING BY IMPLICATION 
The Supreme Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas regarding 
the lower courts’ supposed duty to “follow the case which directly con-
trols”100 is problematic for a number of reasons.  For one thing, the 
Court’s statement—which, “at least in its modern, implacable form, is of 
relatively recent vintage”101—was unaccompanied by any explanation or 
even citation to any other authority.  Be that as it may, there are more 
serious, even fatal, problems with the Court’s statement.  First, the 
Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas is dicta and is not binding ei-
ther on the Court or on any lower court.  Second, the Court’s statement in 
Rodriguez de Quijas has itself been overruled by implication.  Lower 
courts should—indeed, they must—ignore this statement even in cases 
where it might apply, including those thought to be controlled by Almen-
darez-Torres. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Statement Regarding Overruling by Implication 
Was Dicta and Need Not Be Followed 
Before considering the precise meaning of the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Rodriguez de Quijas,102 one might consider some prelimi-
nary questions regarding the nature of that statement.  Why the Court 
might have made this statement has already been discussed.103  But even 
if the “why” is clear, one still might fairly ask what made the Court think 
it could make such a statement.  In other words, what was the basis for 
                                                 
 99. Id. at 414 (footnote and citations omitted). 
 100. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 
 101. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 970.  See also Newton, supra note 78, at 799−800 (“Before 
1989, most lower courts believed they possessed the authority to disregard Supreme Court decisions 
that appeared to have lost their precedential value (although never directly overruled by the high 
Court).”). 
 102. The meaning of this statement is discussed in greater detail in Part III.B infra. 
 103. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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making this statement, which the Court seems to regard as some sort of 
binding rule of law? 
There seem to be two broad possibilities.  The first, and perhaps 
most obvious possibility, is that the Supreme Court was simply announc-
ing a rule of law in the course of deciding a case.104  The Court undoubt-
edly is empowered to decide “Cases” and “Controversies,”105 and in the 
course of deciding cases, it may announce rules of law—even novel rules 
of law—that serve not only as the basis for deciding that case, but also as 
precedent in future cases.106  Thus, one might argue that, in the course of 
deciding Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court issued an opinion that included 
this statement, and for this reason this statement must be followed by 
lower courts. 
The problem with this argument is that the mere inclusion of lan-
guage in a Supreme Court opinion does not necessarily transform that 
language into law.  Courts, including the Supreme Court, have long rec-
ognized a distinction between a holding and dicta107 and have consis-
tently held that only the former is binding.108  Although the Court has yet 
to clearly demarcate the boundary between these concepts, Michael 
Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns, in what might be the definitive 
treatment of this subject, conclude: “A holding consists of those proposi-
tions along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are 
actually decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to 
the judgment.  If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case counts as 
dicta.”109 
                                                 
 104. The other broad possibility—that the Court might have been engaging in supervisory 
court rulemaking—is discussed in Part III.A.2 infra. 
 105. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 106. See Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial 
Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811, 838 (2003) [hereinafter Shannon, Retroactive]. 
 107. “The term dicta typically refers to statements in a judicial opinion that are not necessary to 
support the decision reached by the court.”  Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1997, 2000 (1994).  “A dictum is usually contrasted with a holding, a term used to refer to a 
rule or principle that decides the case.”  Id. 
 108. As stated by the Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821): 
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be 
taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.  If they go beyond 
the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent 
suit, when the very point is presented for decision. 
See also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522 (1995) (recognizing that obiter dicta “may 
properly be disregarded”); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 454–55 (1972) (observing that 
language “unnecessary to the Court’s decision” “cannot be considered binding authority”); Dorf, 
supra note 107, at 2000 (“It is commonplace that holdings carry greater precedential weight than 
dicta, ‘which may be followed if sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling.’”) (quoting 
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935)). 
 109. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 1065.  Professor Dorf adds: 
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Upon applying the foregoing test to the Rodriguez de Quijas 
Court’s statement regarding the lower courts’ supposed obligation to fol-
low “the case which directly controls,” it is clear that this statement is 
dicta.  This statement had absolutely nothing to do with the manner in 
which the Court reached its decision in that case; indeed, the Court af-
firmed the judgment of the very court it was criticizing.110  And, as dicta, 
this statement is not binding on any court.  Thus, though a court may fol-
low this statement, no court is obligated to do so.111 
The same is true, incidentally, of any statements made by the Court 
that purport to exclude prior convictions from the constitutional defini-
tion of an “element.”  In Jones—the case in which this purported excep-
tion was first suggested—the Court was clear that its definition of “ele-
ment” was only tentative, that precise issue having not been decided.112  
More importantly, Jones did not involve the use of a prior conviction to 
increase a defendant’s sentence.113  The same is true in every case de-
cided by the Court in which this language has been repeated.114  The 
                                                                                                             
An aside is considered dictum because it forms no essential part of either the decision 
reached in the case or the rationale for the decision.  Even if we assume that the court 
takes the opposite position on the issue addressed in the aside, neither the governing 
standard of law announced nor the outcome in the specific case will be changed. 
Dorf, supra note 107, at 2008. 
 110. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989).  
Recall also that the dissent likewise agreed with this statement—often a clue that a statement cannot 
be considered part of the Court’s holding.  See id. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 It should be recognized, though, that one reaches the same conclusion when the lower court’s 
judgment is reversed (or “vacated”), as it was in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997).  In 
Khan, the court of appeals was commended for following Rodriguez de Quijas and applying (misap-
plying, as it turned out) a Supreme Court precedent that appeared to have been implicitly overruled.  
See id. at 20.  But nothing about the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas led to the Khan 
Court’s holding that the precedent in question had been effectively overruled.  See id. at 21 (“With 
the views underlying Albrecht eroded by this Court’s precedent, there is not much of that decision to 
salvage.”). 
 The same is true of the Court’s invocation of this statement in Agostini.  See Agostini v. Felton, 
521 U.S. 203, 235−38 (1997).  Indeed, the Agostini Court all but acknowledged the same.  See id. at 
237−38 (“Adherence to this teaching by the District Court and Court of Appeals in this litigation 
does not insulate a legal principle on which they relied from our review to determine its continued 
vitality.”).  See also Baxter, supra note 16, at 436 n.493 (“[T]he Court will affirm or reverse the 
lower court’s judgment based on the Court’s view of the substantive legal issue, not the lower 
court’s obedience to the Rodriguez de Quijas principle.  In fact, . . . the Court will affirm when the 
lower court disobeys the Rodriguez de Quijas stricture, and reverse when the lower court obeys.”). 
 111. One might appreciate the irony, though, of the Court’s attempts to compel the disregard of 
a holding, which is binding, through the use of dicta, which is not binding. 
 112. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (“Because our prior cases sug-
gest rather than establish this principle, our concern about the Government’s reading of the statute 
rises only to the level of doubt, not certainty.”). 
 113. See id. at 230 (describing the statute at issue in that case). 
 114. As Professor Murphy explains: 
The extended discussion in Apprendi qualifying Almendarez-Torres suggests that the 
“other than the fact of a prior conviction” language in Apprendi is read too broadly if in-
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holdings in Apprendi and later cases must be construed, then, without 
reference to any sort of prior conviction exception—an exercise that re-
sults in a rule of law that is irreconcilably inconsistent with any such ex-
ception.115 
Though it is unclear why a lower court would so faithfully follow 
such dicta, two possibilities come to mind.116  First, lower courts might 
lack a firm understanding of the distinction between a holding and dic-
ta.117  There is, after all, evidence that the Supreme Court itself does not 
fully understand this distinction,118 and there is little reason to think that 
lower courts understand these concepts any better.119  The chief difficulty 
                                                                                                             
terpreted to create an exception to the general rule that any fact that increases the statu-
tory maximum is subject to the jury trial and reasonable doubt guarantees.  Read in con-
text, the language seems merely to acknowledge that the issue of prior convictions was 
not before the Apprendi Court. 
Murphy, supra note 78, at 990 (footnote omitted).  This conclusion is not altered by the fact that this 
additional language was buried in the holding in those cases.  See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under 
the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1257 (2006) (“A dictum is not con-
verted into holding by forceful utterance, or by preceding it with the words, “We hold that . . . .”) 
(ellipsis in the original). 
 115. Accord Murphy, supra note 78, at 979 (concluding that “both the logic of Apprendi and 
considerations distinct to the right to jury trial and the burden of proof indicate that the Constitution 
guarantees jury determination, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the existence of a prior conviction,” 
and thus that lower courts “typically have misread Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi on this mat-
ter”). 
 116. Actually, there might be other possibilities.  For example, it might be that lower courts do 
not understand the distinction between a holding and dicta.  In its extreme form, though, this theory 
seems implausible, for American judges undoubtedly have some understanding of this distinction 
and have some ability to separate a holding from dicta.  (A less extreme form of this theory—and 
one that seems much more plausible—is discussed in the main text infra.) 
 Another possibility, already alluded to, might be that some courts have invoked the rule in 
Rodriguez de Quijas as cover—i.e., as support for some particular, desired result.  This seems at 
least plausible in the case of Almendarez-Torres, as many have voiced dissatisfaction with the Ap-
prendi line of cases, and some might welcome a means of avoiding the application of that precedent 
as to convicted recidivists. 
 A third possibility might be that lower court judges are simply trying to curry favor with the 
justices on the Supreme Court or at least are hoping to avoid their wrath should they “err” (as the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did in Rodriguez de Quijas, making the “mistake” of being right for 
the wrong reasons).  But however plausible these and other similar theories might seem, they are 
difficult to prove and, frankly, unpleasant to consider.  Accordingly, this Article will focus only on 
the possibilities discussed in the main text. 
 117. This is a less extreme form of the theory set forth in note 116 supra. 
 118. See Dorf, supra note 107, at 2003 (observing that “no universal agreement exists as to 
how to measure the scope of judicial holdings”). 
 119. Professor Dorf explains: 
Judges often appear to take for granted that discerning the difference between holding 
and dictum is a routine, noncontroversial matter.  Yet an examination of the kinds of 
statements that courts label dicta reveals gross inconsistencies. . . .  [W]e would find con-
sensus for the judgment that everything that is not holding is dictum and everything that 
is not dictum is holding, but little in the way of a substantive definition of either term. 
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with this theory, though, is that no court seems to be treating the Court’s 
statement in Rodriguez de Quijas as dicta; to the contrary, every court 
seems to be taking it quite seriously. 
This leads to a second possibility: At the Supreme Court level, per-
haps the distinction between a holding and dicta no longer matters, or at 
least does not matter much.  There is some evidence that this also is now 
largely true.120  But this only raises more questions.  Why has this distinc-
tion apparently been obliterated?  And is this merging of a holding with 
dicta proper or a cause for concern? 
Regarding the first question, perhaps part of the reason the distinc-
tion between a holding and dicta seems to have been blurred is because 
of the usefulness—and even legitimacy121—of at least one type of dicta.  
Though there might be many reasons why the Supreme Court might want 
to include dicta in its opinions,122 one reason is to signal how it might 
resolve an issue it has not yet decided.123  After all, the Court lately has 
shown little interest in resolving more than a handful of the cases brought 
before it,124 and one way of dealing with the remainder is to indicate how 
                                                                                                             
Dorf, supra note 107, at 2003−04.  See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 377 (1996) 
(“[R]emarkably—considering how fundamental the distinction is to a system of decision by prece-
dent—the distinction [between holding and dicta] is fuzzy not only at the level of application but 
also at the conceptual level.”). 
 120. As summarized by Charles A. Sullivan: 
The Supreme Court and the federal circuits, without erasing the distinction entirely, have 
moved away from [the] traditional view that only the holding of a case has precedential 
power.  At least with respect to vertical precedent, there is an increasing tendency to hold 
inferior courts bound not merely by what the higher court did but by what it said. 
Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1143, 1152 (2006) (footnote omitted); see also 
Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 994 (“[T]he traditional judicial distinction between dictum and a holding 
seems to play an increasingly insignificant role in the Court’s opinions formulating the ‘rule’ that 
they create, and subsequently in lower courts’ decisions analyzing and applying those rules.”); Lev-
al, supra note 114, at 1250 (“The distinction between dictum and holding is more and more fre-
quently disregarded.”).  Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary now defines “dictum” simply as “[a] state-
ment of opinion or belief considered authoritative because of the dignity of the person making it.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 485 (8th ed. 2004). 
 121. See Dorf, supra note 107, at 2005−09 (discussing “legitimate” dicta); Evan Tsen Lee, 
Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 648 (1992) 
(“It is clear that dicta—whether or not courts deem it to constitute an ‘advisory opinion’—run afoul 
of no constitutional or jurisdictional barrier.”); Leval, supra note 114, at 1253 (“What is problematic 
is not the utterance of dicta, but the failure to distinguish between holding and dictum.”). 
 122. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges As Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1800−03 (1998)  
(discussing possible functions of “advicegiving” in judicial opinions). 
 123. See id. at 1714 (“Advice in judicial decisions acts as a compromise—such language does 
not have the binding force of a holding yet provides some guidance and predictability for the future 
while simultaneously undermining some of the reliance interests that would mandate future applica-
tion of stare decisis.”). 
 124. For example, during the October 2007 Term, though 8,241 cases were filed in the Su-
preme Court, see 2008 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 10, http://www.supremecou 
rtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2008year-endreport.pdf, the Court issued only seventy-three opinions.  
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they might be decided in the future.125  To the extent such dicta turns out 
to be prophetic—i.e., helps lower courts reach the results the Court itself 
would reach—one can see why lawyers and judges might give it the level 
of respect it seems to be receiving.126  This is particularly true when the 
dicta in question appears to have been well-considered.127 
The difficulty, though, is that not all dicta appear to be of the sig-
naling variety, and some do not seem particularly well-considered.  In-
stead, some seem much more gratuitous.  Take once again the Court’s 
statement in Rodriguez de Quijas: In commanding lower courts to follow 
“the case which directly controls,” the Court was not even purporting to 
decide any future case.  Following the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de 
Quijas also might not help a lower court reach the correct result; indeed, 
if the court of appeals in that case would have followed “the case which 
directly controls,” its judgment would have been reversed—and that only 
in the event the Supreme Court accepted review.128  The problem, then, 
might not be so much a failure to distinguish a holding from dicta as it is 
a failure to distinguish between types of dicta.129  And, passing state-
ments unsupported by any authority or even extended discussion are enti-
tled to nothing but disregard.130 
                                                                                                             
See Supreme Court of the United States, 2007 Term Opinions of the Court, http://www.supreme 
courtus.gov/opinions/07slipopinion.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2009). 
 125. See Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Parsing Supreme Court Dicta to Adjudicate Non-Workplace 
Harms, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 75, 105−06 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he seemingly pervasive practice of 
treating Supreme Court dicta as binding is palatable when viewed from this perspective.”). 
 126. See Taylor, supra note 125, at 105−06 (arguing that “even if the Court’s statements are 
not technically binding, they might in some circumstances offer informed insight as to how the Court 
might rule if it faced that issue.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: 
THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 53 (2008) (“The most persuasive nongoverning case authorities 
are the dicta of governing courts . . . .”). 
 127. See Taylor, supra note 125, at 104 (“[M]ost courts agree that lower courts should give 
some degree of respect to Supreme Court dicta if the Court dedicated sufficient consideration to such 
matters.”). 
 128. The Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas also does not appear to have been particu-
larly well-considered; in fact, it does not appear to have received much consideration at all.  Cf. 
Cent. Va. Comm. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006) (“[W]e are not bound to follow our dicta 
in a prior case in which the point now at issue was not fully debated.”). 
 129. As Professor Taylor again explains: 
While this practice of following Supreme Court dicta is acceptable, it is not universally 
desirable.  Most courts, while suggesting that Supreme Court dicta is highly persuasive, 
nevertheless recognize that dicta should be disregarded in some cases.  That is, while 
some dicta deserves precedential respect, other dicta, for a variety of reasons, does not.  
The courts, however, . . . have not developed a cohesive or adequate measure of this dis-
tinction.  Instead, the criteria employed to assess whether a particular dictum should be 
disregarded are scattered and mostly without instruction. 
Taylor, supra note 125, at 106−07. 
 130. The same is true of the Supreme Court’s post-Almendarez-Torres “prior conviction” 
language.  Like the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas, such language must not be viewed in 
isolation, but rather in the context in which it appears.  And when viewed in context, it is clearly 
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With respect to the second question raised above—whether the 
merging of a holding with dicta proper is a cause for concern—the an-
swer is clear.  There are both accuracy- and legitimacy-based justifica-
tions for distinguishing a holding from dicta, and although neither is un-
assailable as a justification for giving less weight to dicta than to hold-
ings, “both the adversary system and the premise that courts have less 
authority to prescribe general-purpose rules than legislatures are so firm-
ly rooted in American legal practice as to rank as axiomatic.”131 
In summary, Supreme Court precedents are what they are, and they 
are not what they are not.  In particular, the mere inclusion of words in a 
Court’s opinion does not elevate those words to the level of law.132  In 
some situations, dicta might merit some attention by those concerned 
with predicting the future course of the law.  But in other situations, dicta 
may be fairly ignored.133  The Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas, 
as well as any qualification of its holding in Apprendi relating to Almen-
darez-Torres, falls into the latter category. 
                                                                                                             
(and irreconcilably) inconsistent with the holdings of the very cases in which it appears.  It is diffi-
cult to understand how such language—which here also is never explained—could be construed as 
signaling anything. 
 131. Dorf, supra note 107, at 2002−03.  Judge Leval explains the rationale behind this distinc-
tion in more constitutionally based terms: 
Congress is also entitled to respect.  If all the members of Congress were to subscribe to a 
resolution, not following the procedures necessary to enact statutory law, the resolution 
would not be law because it was not promulgated in the manner in which Congress is 
permitted to make law. The same should be true when the Supreme Court or any other 
court makes pronouncements in a manner that is not within its constitutional power to 
make law. 
Leval, supra note 114, at 1274 n.78.  See also Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 1019 (simi-
larly justifying this distinction).  Thus, if the members of the Supreme Court were to stand on the 
courthouse steps and announce some particular rule of law, completely un-tethered to any case cur-
rently before it, such a rule (unless a proper exercise of its rulemaking power; see infra Part III.A.2) 
presumably would have no effect, regardless of how impressive the delivery.  The same presumably 
would be true if the rule in question was issued on Supreme Court letterhead and signed by each of 
the Justices.  Why, then, do such statements take on any more importance simply because they are 
buried inside of some Supreme Court opinion? 
 132. As Professors Abramowicz and Stearns explain: 
“Actually decided” does not mean “expressly stated.”  The “actually decided” require-
ment is broader in the sense that it includes implicit holdings that the court never quite 
explicitly announces.  But it is narrower in that it excludes some statements that figure in 
the reasoning of the case, but that a fair construction of the opinion would not find to lie 
on the path from case facts to case disposition. 
Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 1070.  See also Bradley Scott Shannon, Responding to 
Summary Judgment, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 825 (2008) (“Supreme Court decisions are not like 
papal bulls; not everything the Court says matters.”). 
 133. Cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (“[W]e think it generally 
undesirable, where holdings of the Court are not at issue, to dissect the sentences of the United 
States Reports as though they were the United States Code.”). 
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1.  May the Court’s Statement be Regarded as Decisional Methodology? 
Some might argue that the above discussion of holding is unrea-
sonably narrow in that it fails to capture what might be termed decisional 
methodology.  In other words, perhaps a court’s holding should be re-
garded as including not only the rule of law used to decide the case, but 
also analytical methods used by the court to reach that decision.  Thus, 
for example, a holding involving the interpretation of a statute might in-
clude the particular theory of statutory interpretation used to reach the 
result.  By similar reasoning, the Supreme Court’s holding in Rodriguez 
de Quijas might be thought of as including not only the enforceability of 
an arbitration agreement but also the Court’s statement regarding the du-
ty of a lower court to “follow the case which directly controls,” even 
when that case “rest[s] on reasons rejected in some other line of deci-
sions.”134 
But, there are at least two problems with this argument.  First, while 
some believe that decisional methodology may count as a holding,135 
some do not,136 and the Court itself has yet to clearly resolve this issue.137  
Second, even if one presumes that decisional methodology may some-
                                                 
 134. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).  For 
example, Professor Baxter seems to presume that the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas qual-
ifies as decisional methodology, and therefore not dicta, though he does not analyze the issue.  See 
Baxter, supra note 16, at 436 n.493. 
 135. For example, Justice Scalia has written: 
[W]hen the Supreme Court of the federal system, or of one of the state systems, decides a 
case, not merely the outcome of that decision, but the mode of analysis that it applies will 
thereafter be followed by the lower courts within that system, and even by that supreme 
court itself. 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989); see also 
Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1863 (2008) (arguing that courts should give doctrines of statutory interpretation stare 
decisis effect); Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare 
Decisis as Applied to Judicial Methodologies, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681 (2008) (similarly arguing 
that stare decisis should attach to a court’s decision-making methodology). 
 136. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 1071 (arguing that “a judge’s selection 
of a particular interpretive methodology will not necessarily credit that methodological choice as a 
holding”). 
 137. Indeed, it might be that the Supreme Court generally may not dictate the decisional meth-
odology used by lower federal courts, the argument being that the choice of decisional methodology 
is an inseparable component of the Article III judicial function.  See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, 
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2145 n.267 (2002) (asking 
whether one’s “choice of interpretive methodology” is “not merely . . . an inalienable component of 
the judicial power but rather . . . an inalienable prerogative of each individual Article III judge”).  Cf. 
Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 
CONST. COMMENT. 191, 214 (2001) (“The principle of departmental independence . . . entails an 
independent judicial power to ascertain, interpret, and apply the relevant law.  Congress cannot tell 
courts how to reason any more than it can tell courts how to decide.”).  If this is true, then this is yet 
another reason why the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas is not binding. 
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times count as a holding, it still does not seem that the Court’s statement 
in Rodriguez de Quijas qualifies.  The problem, again, relates to the fact 
that the Court’s statement in no way led to its decision in that case.  For, 
unlike the application of a particular theory of statutory interpretation—
which, if followed by lower courts in similar cases, might lead to better 
decision making (at least in terms of fewer reversals)—the Court’s 
statement in Rodriguez de Quijas has no such effect.  In fact, if anything, 
a faithful following of this “rule” has the opposite effect and actually 
results in a higher probability of reversal.138  The decisional methodology 
argument therefore fails for the same reason that the more general hold-
ing argument fails: the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas is pure 
dicta, an aside with no relevance to the decision in that case. 
2.  May the Court’s Statement be Regarded as an Exercise of 
Supervisory Rulemaking Authority? 
Another possibility is that the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de 
Quijas might be regarded as an exercise of the Court’s supervisory rule-
making power.  It is well accepted that the Supreme Court possesses 
some power of this nature.139  Could this provide authority for binding 
the lower courts in this manner? 
Almost certainly not.  For one thing, most, if not all, of the Court’s 
supervisory rulemaking inheres in Congress and reaches the Court only 
via the Rules Enabling Act.140  An exercise of rulemaking power pursu-
ant to that Act requires compliance with the formal, statutory rulemaking 
process141—something that obviously was not done here.  Furthermore, 
the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas would not be regarded as 
procedural because it has nothing to do with the manner in which a case 
is adjudicated; rather, the statement would be regarded as affecting sub-
stantive rights, as it relates only to the determination of the appropriate 
                                                 
 138. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.  This might be another way of saying that the 
act of overruling itself (as opposed to the decision to overrule) cannot be regarded as decisional 
methodology.  Certainly, as part of the judicial decision-making process, a court must ascertain the 
relevant law, a process that might include the overruling of precedent.  But once that law is ascer-
tained and applied and the case has been decided, the court’s work is at an end.  Whether the court 
has, in fact, overruled precedent is largely irrelevant to this process. 
 139. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“This Court has supervi-
sory authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence 
and procedure that are binding in those tribunals.”). 
 140. See Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 324, 328 (2006) (“Congress can decide to give the Supreme Court [supervisory] power through 
enabling legislation, but it seems exceedingly unlikely that the Constitution confers it.”). 
 141. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071−2077 (2006). 
178 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:151 
substantive law.142  Thus, this “rule” also could not properly be the prod-
uct of that process.143 
Alternatively, one might argue that the Court’s statement in Rodri-
guez de Quijas is justifiable as an exercise of the Court’s “inherent” su-
pervisory power—i.e., power it derives by virtue of being the “supreme” 
court described in Article III of the United States Constitution.  It is also 
generally agreed that the Court possesses some inherent rulemaking 
power.144 
This argument, though, also fails.  Most, if not all, of the Court’s 
inherent rulemaking power is “local” in nature—i.e., binding on the 
Court itself, but not necessarily on any other court.145  Moreover, even if 
proper as an exercise not of “local,” but rather “supervisory” rulemaking 
power, it seems that any such “rule” would have to be the product of ad-
judication, the resolution of “Cases” or “Controversies”146 being the 
manner by which the Article III power must be exercised.147  But in order 
to count as “law” through adjudication, the “law” in question would 
                                                 
 142. Consider also that the Court’s statement presumably is binding on state courts as well—
something that clearly would be beyond the formal rulemaking power.  For a similar argument 
reaching the same conclusion with respect to the court of appeals’ “unpublished” decision rules, see 
Bradley Scott Shannon, May Stare Decisis Be Abrogated by Rule?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 658−71  
(2006). 
 143. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)−(b) (2006) (providing that the Supreme Court is empowered to 
prescribe only “general rules of practice and procedure” that do not “abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right”). 
 144. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). 
 145. See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 817 (2008) 
(“[A]ny procedural authority conferred by Article III is entirely local.  In other words, Article III 
empowers a court to regulate its own proceedings, but it does not empower a reviewing court to 
supervise the proceedings of a lower court by prescribing procedures that the lower court must fol-
low.”) (footnote omitted). 
That is so because Article III vests “the judicial Power” in each Article III court.  To the 
extent that “the judicial Power” carries with it the power to regulate procedure in the 
course of adjudicating cases, each court possesses that power in its own right.  To be 
sure, an appellate court can set aside a rule adopted by a lower court on the ground that 
the rule exceeds the bounds of the lower court’s authority.  But, the content of any proce-
dure adopted pursuant to inherent procedural authority lies fundamentally within the dis-
cretion of the adopting court.  As a result, inherent procedural authority does not enable 
the development of procedural doctrines that are uniform across jurisdictions. 
Id.  See also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 264 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“I do not see the basis for any direct authority to supervise lower courts.”). 
 146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 147. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1682 n.11 (2004) (questioning “how the exercise of a power to promul-
gate prospective, legislative-like rules can be squared with the grant of judicial power in Article III,” 
and distinguishing the “procedure fashioned (or applied as precedent) in the context of deciding a 
case”).  See also Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1273 (1996) (“The judicial power is the power to decide 
cases or controversies in accordance with governing law.”). 
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again have to appear as a holding.148  And so for this reason also, any 
appeal to supervisory rulemaking authority likewise seems unavailing. 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Statement Regarding Overruling by Implication 
Has Itself Been Overruled by Implication 
The preceding section dealt with the nature of the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Rodriguez de Quijas without considering the precise mean-
ing of that statement.  But what exactly was the Rodriguez de Quijas 
Court saying, or trying to say? 
As simple as the Court’s statement might seem, there actually ap-
pear to be several possibilities.  For example, the Court might have been 
simply rejecting the concept of anticipatory overruling,149 rather than 
overruling by implication.150  This interpretation makes some sense, in 
that anticipatory overruling is widely regarded as inappropriate, and thus 
its rejection by the Court would neither be surprising nor controversial.  
This reading also accounts for the word “appears”—i.e., the Court did 
not speak of precedent that “rest[s] on reasons rejected in some other line 
of decisions,” but rather only precedent that “appears to rest on reasons 
rejected in some other line of decisions.”151  Moreover, the Court spoke 
                                                 
 148. Consider (again) that the Court in Rodriguez de Quijas undoubtedly intended that its 
statement be binding on state courts also, and yet it has stated that “[i]t is beyond dispute that we do 
not hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several States.”  Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428, 438 (2000).  Of course, the Dickerson Court avoided this result by proclaiming the rule at 
issue in that case (Miranda warnings) to be constitutionally based.  See id. at 437−42.  But that the 
Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas is constitutionally based seems extremely doubtful.  See 
John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 520 (2000) 
(observing that the Rodriguez de Quijas Court “made no attempt to ground [its statement] in the 
Constitution” and arguing that “it is not clear where in the Constitution one would point in order so 
to ground it”).  Whether adherence to Supreme Court precedent is to any extent constitutionally 
compelled is a subject of considerable debate, and certainly the notion that this particular permuta-
tion of that doctrine is derived from that authority represents a remarkable proposition— and one 
that the Court has never recognized. 
 149. See Baxter, supra note 16, at 444 (“Doubtless, one reason [for the Court’s statement in 
Rodriguez de Quijas] is the fear that ‘rogue’ district judges otherwise might disregard a Supreme 
Court precedent simply because they, for whatever reasons, find it incorrect or unattractive.”). 
 150. Regarding the distinction between overruling by implication and anticipatory overruling, 
Professor Kniffin explains: 
Departure by a court of appeals from a precedent impliedly overruled by the Supreme 
Court should not be confused with anticipatory overruling.  Implied overruling occurs 
when the Supreme Court, without mentioning that it is overturning its previous decision, 
determines that the rule of law that the precedent enunciated is no longer correct.  The 
precedent therefore no longer exists as such, and a lower court should not follow it. . . .   
Anticipatory overruling, by contrast, occurs when a lower court departs from a higher 
court’s decision embodying a rule of law that the higher court has not repudiated either 
explicitly or by implication. 
Kniffin, supra note 23, at 57 (footnotes omitted). 
 151. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (em-
phasis added). 
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of the “prerogative of overruling its own decisions”152—an assertion that 
makes little sense if the decision in question has already been overruled. 
If this interpretation of Rodriguez de Quijas is correct, then the 
lower courts have badly—very badly—misinterpreted the Court’s mes-
sage.  But that is also the chief criticism of this interpretation.  Few seem 
to believe that the Court was speaking only of anticipatory overruling 
because the precedent with “direct application” in Rodriguez de Quijas—
as well as in Khan and Agostini—had not just been rendered suspect by 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions; it had been eviscerated. 
This leaves at least two other possibilities.  It could be that the Su-
preme Court, through its statement in Rodriguez de Quijas, was essen-
tially establishing two different lines of authority—one for the Court, and 
one for lower courts—in which overruling by implication remains a pos-
sibility with respect to the former, but not as to the latter.  Such a reading 
is conceivable; again, the precedent with “direct application” in Rodri-
guez de Quijas certainly appeared to have been overruled, at least implic-
itly, and yet the lower court in that case was chastised for having so con-
cluded.153  But such an interpretation raises knotty questions regarding 
the relationship between horizontal and vertical stare decisis, for it means 
that there might exist a body of law that is binding on the Court itself but 
not on any lower court.154  This interpretation also ignores the fact that in 
Rodriguez de Quijas, Khan, and Agostini, the Court proceeded to ex-
pressly overrule a precedent that, if overruled by implication, would not 
be in need of overruling, for it would already be quite dead.155 
                                                 
 152. Id. 
 153. See also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (“We do not acknowledge, and we 
do not hold, that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled 
an earlier precedent.”). 
 154. As Professor Bhagwat explains (with respect to the Court’s decision in Agostini): 
This leads to a very peculiar conclusion: that the “law” in effect at the time the motion 
was brought was different for the Supreme Court and for all other courts, because the ef-
fect of precedent varied in the Supreme Court as opposed to other courts.  If the reason-
ing and underpinnings of the precedent had been weakened, the precedent was no longer 
valid in the Court itself, but it retained its validity for the rest of the judiciary. 
Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 1001 (footnote omitted). 
 155. As Professor Dorf observes: 
The appeals court in Rodriguez concluded that Wilko had been overruled sub silentio by 
subsequent cases.  It did not predict that the Supreme Court would overrule Wilko, but 
reasoned that the Court had already done so, basing this determination entirely on imper-
sonal materials.  Since, in my view, such a determination represents conventional legal 
reasoning, it ought to be a permissible choice for a lower court.  The contrary view 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez appears to confuse the power to declare a 
precedent dead with the power to kill it. 
Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 676−77 n.87 (1995) (cita-
tions omitted). 
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And this leads to a third possibility: perhaps the Rodriguez de Qui-
jas Court was, in essence, overruling the concept of overruling by impli-
cation.  This might seem somewhat radical, in that this might not have 
been quite what the Court intended.156  But precedents are what they are, 
and in this context, the intent of the precedent-setting court is largely ir-
relevant.157  Such a reading also explains the Court’s perceived need in 
Rodriguez de Quijas and later cases to expressly overrule the “problem” 
precedent in question.  In other words, perhaps the Court was not simply 
afraid that lower courts might guess wrong; perhaps it truly believed that 
an irreconcilably inconsistent holding alone was insufficient to effect an 
overruling of that earlier precedent. 
If this reading is correct, and if this statement somehow counts as a 
holding,158 then overruling by implication is no more unless that “prece-
dent” itself has been overruled.  Has it?  The Supreme Court has yet to 
expressly overrule this portion of Rodriguez de Quijas.159  But has it been 
overruled by implication? 
Before answering this question, one must consider whether a prece-
dent rejecting overruling by implication may itself be overruled by im-
plication.  Though a complete exploration of this question might prove 
interesting, the tentative the answer would seem to be yes.160  For if this 
were not true, it would mean that the Supreme Court has the power to 
prevent a later Supreme Court from overruling at least some of its prior 
precedents, and that seems highly unlikely; among other problems, it is 
difficult to see how such a “holding” might be enforced.161  Accordingly, 
                                                 
 156. It also would be somewhat ironic, in that this would mean that the Court overruled by 
implication overruling by implication. 
 157. See supra Part II.A.  Consider also the prominent, recent example of an attempt by the 
Supreme Court to limit the scope of its holding found in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  Near the 
end of its opinion, the Court added: “Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances . . . .”  
Id. at 109.  Many have rejected the notion that future, otherwise indistinguishable cases should be 
rendered distinguishable solely on the basis of this language.  See, e.g., Michael Sinclair, Precedent, 
Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 401 (2007) (arguing that the Court’s attempt to limit 
the effect of its holding in that case was “at best dicta, at worst circular, relying on the principle [it] 
purport[s] to modify”). 
 158. Part III.A of this Article argued that the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas was not 
a holding but rather was dicta that fairly may be disregarded.  But to the extent that this conclusion is 
incorrect, the remainder of this Article becomes relevant. 
 159. But for a glimpse of what such an opinion might look like, see infra Part III.C. 
 160. This assumes that the doctrine of stare decisis itself is constitutional.  Some have argued 
that it is not, at least in certain forms and in certain contexts.  See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme 
Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1166−67 n.3 (2008) (collecting 
authorities).  To the extent that this doctrine is unconstitutional, the answer to the question posed 
above would definitely be yes. 
 161. See Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910) (asserting that whether stare decisis 
“shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court”); Albert 
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this Article assumes that overruling by implication remains a possible 
means of overruling precedent, even within the Supreme Court. 
The question then becomes, again, whether the Court has overruled 
this prohibition as to overruling by implication.  The answer to this ques-
tion also appears to be yes.  For, in order to find proof, one need only to 
find a later case in which any precedent has been overruled by implica-
tion, the idea again being that the Court could not decide a case in a 
manner irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior holding without overrul-
ing that holding.  And there appears to be at least one case, Apprendi, 
that overruled, by implication, another, Almendarez-Torres. 
As a result, the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas regarding 
overruling by implication has itself been overruled by implication in Ap-
prendi.  And for this reason also, lower courts should consider them-
selves free to apply the holdings in Apprendi and its progeny to their log-
ical limits. 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Statement Regarding Overruling by Implication 
Should Be Expressly Overruled 
It should now be clear that, for at least two reasons, the Supreme 
Court’s attempted repudiation of overruling by implication should be 
ignored.  Still, some lower courts might be hesitant to deviate from that 
instruction without more definitive guidance.  It therefore would be help-
ful if the Court were to expressly overrule the Rodriguez de Quijas 
Court’s mandate that lower courts follow the case which “directly con-
trols,” when that case itself has been overruled by implication.162 
In deciding whether to overrule precedent, the primary question, of 
course, is whether that precedent is in some significant sense “wrong,” or 
is at least substantially inferior to whatever might replace it.163  And here, 
the idea that lower courts should adhere to overruled Supreme Court 
precedent simply because that overruling was not made expressly is 
wrong.  Again, almost everyone agrees that the Supreme Court alone is 
                                                                                                             
P. Blaustein & Andrew H. Field, “Overruling” Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L. REV. 
151, 166 (1958) (“There are no legal limits to the ‘right’ to overrule.”). 
 162. The need to overrule this portion of Rodriguez de Quijas of course presupposes that it 
constitutes a holding, and as has already been explained, it arguably does not.  But, because lower 
courts seem to be treating this language as if it was a holding, express direction from the Court 
(again) would be helpful.  Thus, this section assumes that this portion of Rodriguez de Quijas consti-
tutes precedent in the strong sense of the term. 
 163. See Paulsen, supra note 160, at 1210 (“The primary inquiry . . . is whether a prior decision 
(or line of decisions) is right or wrong, on independent . . . criteria one thinks are correct on grounds 
other than precedent.”).  Indeed, this might well be the only relevant question.  See id.; but see Ran-
gel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200, 1201 (2006) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the 
petitions for writs of certiorari) (“While I continue to believe that Almendarez-Torres was wrong-
fully decided, that is not a sufficient reason for revisiting the issue.”). 
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empowered to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court.  But lower 
courts must be given the opportunity to determine whether and to what 
extent Supreme Court precedent has been overruled, either expressly or 
implicitly, and then to disregard that precedent as appropriate.  Only then 
can lower courts fulfill their obligation under our system of vertical stare 
decisis.  At least to this extent, Rodriguez de Quijas should be expressly 
overruled.164 
One might further observe that there is precedent, in a sense, for do-
ing what is sought to be accomplished here—namely, the express over-
ruling of precedent that has already been overruled by implication.  That 
precedent, ironically enough, is Rodriguez de Quijas, for in that case, the 
Court did precisely that.  And as indicated in Part III.B, the “rule” at is-
sue here has been overruled by implication, for it is irreconcilably incon-
sistent with the Court’s continuing practice of overruling by implication.  
It would seem, then, that there is little left to do in order to nudge this 
aspect of Rodriguez de Quijas over the edge other than to expressly rec-
ognize that this has already occurred. 
Still, it has become almost routine Supreme Court practice to dis-
cuss, expressly, the propriety of overruling as a prelude to the act of 
overruling itself.165  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,166 the Court set 
forth what seems to have become the standard for assessing the propriety 
of overruling its own precedent: 
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is cus-
tomarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic consid-
erations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior deci-
sion with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective 
costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.  Thus, for example, 
we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in 
defying practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind 
of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences 
of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether 
related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the 
old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether 
facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have 
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.167 
                                                 
 164. It might be that Rodriguez de Quijas stands for some broader proposition, and that the 
broader proposition also should be overruled, but that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 165. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479−85 
(1989); Dunn, supra note 18, at 518 (“Many times, before the Court overrules a case, it acknowl-
edges the doctrine of stare decisis, as if to prove that it is not making the decision to overrule arbi-
trarily.”). 
 166. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 167. Id. at 854−55 (citations omitted). 
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Under this standard, then, the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de 
Quijas should be expressly overruled if, in addition to being “wrong,” 
the “rule” announced in that case has defied workability; has not gener-
ated substantial reliance interests; is a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or 
has been weakened due to changed facts.168 
Before engaging in this analysis, a few observations might be in or-
der.  First, though the Court today often includes such an analysis in its 
overruling decisions, there does not seem to be any requirement that the 
Court do so, at least insofar as the precedential effect of the overruling 
decision is concerned.  As with express overruling itself, it might be pre-
ferable, for various reasons, that the Court engage in this discussion.  But 
a bare holding that is irreconcilably inconsistent with an earlier holding, 
particularly if accompanied by language indicating that the earlier hold-
ing is indeed overruled, accomplishes such an overruling no less com-
pletely than does a similar opinion accompanied by a protracted Casey-
type analysis.169 
Moreover, there also does not seem to be any requirement that the 
Court engage in this particular type of analysis.  Again, it might be de-
sirable, for normative reasons, that the Court consider the ramifications 
of its decisions and whether it has formulated the best rules of law possi-
ble.  But a Casey-type analysis, at best, represents decisional methodol-
ogy, and even if considered binding, this methodology itself presumably 
could be overruled by a later decision.170  More to the point, even a poor-
ly reasoned decision has precedential force,171 and as previously dis-
                                                 
 168. See id.  A further reading of Casey reveals a fifth factor: whether the overruling would 
impair judicial integrity.  See Paulsen, supra note 160, at 1198−99. 
 Incidentally, though Professor Paulsen answers the question raised in the title of his article 
(i.e., whether the doctrine of stare decisis requires adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis) in the 
negative, see id. at 1167, it would seem that one could not rely on that determination (however cor-
rect it might be) until the Court so holds, implicitly if not expressly.  And even assuming that that is 
possible—e.g., that this is a matter that may be encapsulated by a holding (see supra Part III.A.1)—
it does not appear (at least not clearly) that this has yet occurred. 
 169. And of course, the absence of such analysis does not necessarily mean that the Court did 
not engage in that analysis.  See Foster, supra note 135, at 1875 (“In theory, the Court might conduct 
this [Casey] analysis implicitly rather than explicitly, but in practice the norm is to conduct such 
doctrinal analysis explicitly, and, consistent with this norm, changes in doctrine in the substantive 
law context are frequently accompanied by such analysis.”). 
 170. Justice Scalia has argued that “stare decisis ought to be applied even to the doctrine of 
stare decisis.”  Casey, 505 U.S. at 993 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part).  But even if true, even he would agree that this doctrine is not an “inexorable command,” 
meaning that the doctrine itself might be subject to revision. Id. at 854 (opinion of the Court). 
 171. Such a decision might be more susceptible to subsequent overruling, though, and those 
affected thereby should be aware of this possibility.  This is also not to say that poorly reasoned 
decisions do not cause problems.  For example, it might be that poor judicial reasoning is at least 
partly behind the prospective-application movement, the idea being that the retroactive application 
2009] Overruled by Implication 185 
cussed, even a lack of intent that any precedent be overruled would not 
prevent such overruling from occurring in fact.172 
Be that as it may, it appears that the Court prefers to perform some-
thing like a Casey-type analysis prefatory to an express overruling.  So 
how does Rodriguez de Quijas fare? 
Not well.  The Casey Court began its stare decisis analysis by con-
sidering whether the rule in question had defied practical workability.173  
According to Professor Paulsen, “the inquiry into workability appears to 
ask whether the rule of a precedent decision, besides being wrong, has 
tended to generate inconsistent applications, fostered unclarity and un-
certainty, or proven difficult to manage in any kind of principled way—
and on such account should be regarded as intolerable.”174 
One might guess that the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas 
has not proven unworkable, for the lower courts in Khan and Agostini 
seemed to get it “right” and have been unanimous in their continued ad-
herence to Almendarez-Torres.  But a closer look at the precise language 
used by the Court reveals some difficulties.  The Rodriguez de Quijas 
Court stated: “If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, 
yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the 
Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving 
to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”175  In order 
to apply this “rule,” a lower court has to make at least two determina-
tions.  First, it must determine whether there exists a Supreme Court 
precedent that has “direct application” to the case under consideration.  
Second, should there exist other relevant Supreme Court precedents, and 
in particular, precedents that appear to reject the reasoning used in the 
“directly applicable” precedent, the lower court must determine which 
among those various precedents “directly controls.” 
This exercise is not as easy as it might sound.  For one thing, rea-
sonable jurists might differ as to which precedents, if any, have “direct 
application.”176  Moreover, the Court in Rodriguez de Quijas failed to 
instruct the lower courts as to what they should do in the event that more 
than one Supreme Court precedent has “direct application.”  And what if 
                                                                                                             
of a decision that fails to adequately account for the precedential effects of that decision is more 
likely to lead to unfair results.  See Shannon, Retroactive, supra note 106, at 851−59. 
 172. See supra notes 17−21 and accompanying text. 
 173. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. 
 174. Paulsen, supra note 160, at 1175. 
 175. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 
 176. Cf. David C. Bratz, Comment, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise of 
Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. L. REV. 87, 89 n.10 (1984) (“What is meant by ‘directly on 
point’ is a question of considerable controversy; the question turns on what it is about a precedent 
that lower courts must follow.”). 
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the earlier case does not simply “appear” to rest on reasons rejected in 
some other line of decisions?  What if, as in the case of Almendarez-
Torres, the reasoning of the earlier decision has been flatly and undenia-
bly rejected by some other line of decisions? 
The bottom line is that the “rule” announced in Rodriguez de Qui-
jas is not so amenable to mechanical application as the Rodriguez de 
Quijas Court might have imagined.  In fact, the more one thinks about 
this “rule,” the more indeterminate and incoherent it becomes.177  A low-
er court certainly could not be faulted for misapplying this “rule” or for 
determining that Rodriguez de Quijas simply does not apply in the great 
many cases in which Supreme Court precedents might seem to conflict. 
On the other hand, lower courts seem fairly adept at determining 
whether Supreme Court precedent has been overruled by implication.178  
For example, in Rodriguez de Quijas itself, the court of appeals got it 
right.  In the rare event that a lower court misreads Supreme Court 
precedent, the Court may correct the problem through a grant of certio-
rari and reversal of the erroneous lower court judgment.179  Such a re-
gime is much more likely to ensure lower court adherence to Supreme 
Court precedent than is the regime created by Rodriguez de Quijas.180 
                                                 
 177. Accord Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 975−76 (observing that, “if taken literally (as the Court 
seems to indicate it should be), the rule of Rodriguez de Quijas can lead to extreme and absurd re-
sults”). 
 178. As Professor Kelman observed more than forty years ago: 
The lower judge is required to determine not only the relevancy of past decisions but to 
pass on their current precedential force.  This latter task varies in difficulty and some-
times involves a sophisticated process of doctrinal analysis yielding the conclusion that a 
decision has or has not been overruled by implication. 
Kelman, supra note 18, at 15.  Accord Bradford, supra note 4, at 85 (“Courts are entrusted with a 
variety of judgment calls.  If they can be trusted to apply precedent properly and faithfully and to 
interpret statutes and determine their constitutionality, they can also be trusted to decide honestly 
whether a Supreme Court precedent is so obviously injured that it should be disregarded.”). 
 179. Indeed, this leads to a second “workability” problem with the Court’s statement in Rodri-
guez de Quijas: “the Supreme Court is without means of enforcing this requirement.”  Harrison, 
supra note 148, at 520 n.53.  For “[l]ower courts that violate the rule but guess right about what he 
Supreme Court will do will be affirmed, while perhaps at the same time being told that they misbe-
haved by deciding the case correctly.”  Id. 
 180. As Professor Bhagwat explains: 
There is an inefficiency . . . in requiring litigants to go all the way to the Supreme Court 
to overturn a precedent which is widely acknowledged to be moribund . . . .  Furthermore, 
one consequence of the rule of Rodriguez de Quijas is that when the Court adopts a new 
approach in an area of law, especially constitutional law, it takes much longer for that ap-
proach to be fully adopted and implemented by the rest of the judiciary.  The lower courts 
remain obliged to follow extant, narrow, and older precedents that are directly on point, 
even if their reasoning and result is clearly inconsistent with the Court’s recent decisions. 
Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 975.  Similarly, Professor Bradford argues: 
[S]hould not the lower court also follow the later case where the rejection is implicit ra-
ther than explicit?  If the goal is allegiance to the Supreme Court, it is sophistry to require 
the lower court to follow doctrine that the Court has rejected, simply because the Su-
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The second Casey factor is reliance—specifically, “whether the rule 
is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the 
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudia-
tion.”181  Here, the reliance interests seem low.  The “persons” most af-
fected by Rodriguez de Quijas are the lower courts, which presumably 
would have little trouble adjusting to the new regime.  Indeed, they 
would simply be returning to the manner in which lower courts dealt 
with conflicting precedents prior to 1989 (and, presumably, in which 
American courts other than those bound by the Supreme Court currently 
resolve such conflicts).182 
Of course, some might argue that this focus on the nature of this 
“rule” does not fully capture the cost of repudiating Rodriguez de Quijas.  
For, the “rule” in Rodriguez de Quijas is actually something of a meta-
rule, meaning that the full cost of overruling Rodriguez de Quijas also 
could be considered as including the associated costs of finally disregard-
ing precedent (such as Almendarez-Torres) that has been overruled by 
implication.  But notice how this “cost” differs from the costs typically 
associated with the overruling of Supreme Court precedent.  In the more 
typical overruling situation, the law is in some sense changing.  By con-
trast, if the Court were to overrule Rodriguez de Quijas, the lower courts 
would simply be applying that which has already become the law.  If one 
assumes that the Court is generally aware that there might be costs asso-
ciated with overruling precedent, and if the Court adequately accounts 
for those costs in making the decision to overrule—both reasonable as-
sumptions183—then the costs associated with the overruling of Rodriguez 
de Quijas would again seem to be minimal. 
The third Casey factor is “whether related principles of law have so 
far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of 
                                                                                                             
preme Court has not ruled on the particular issue confronting the lower court.  How is fe-
alty served when the lower court is clearly convinced that its ruling is contrary to the 
choice the Supreme Court itself would make?  To disregard the current doctrine and ap-
ply the discredited case is the greater violation of the duty of loyalty. 
Bradford, supra note 4, at 83. 
 181. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
 182. As Professor Paulsen explains regarding the doctrine of stare decisis generally: 
The current doctrine . . . does not seem like the kind of legal formulation that causes per-
sons to invest resources or otherwise sink costs.  It is not the type of legal rule or standard 
to which society has become accustomed (as Miranda is claimed to be, in Dickerson) or 
around which people have ordered their lives or thinking (as Roe is claimed to be, in Ca-
sey). . . .  The doctrine is not a substantive one. It is second-order “lawyer’s law” . . . . 
Paulsen, supra note 160, at 1203. 
 183. See Shannon, Retroactive, supra note 106, at 858 (“[B]ecause the idea that a court’s deci-
sion . . . will have certain impacts not only on the parties then before that court but also on all others 
affected by that precedent is so familiar as a matter of American jurisprudence, it is difficult to imag-
ine that a law-changing court . . . would fail adequately to consider possible reliance interests.”). 
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abandoned doctrine.”184  Here, the answer appears to be yes, in that the 
Court, post-Rodriguez de Quijas, continues to overrule precedent by im-
plication, a practice that it has never expressly repudiated (and probably 
could not repudiate even if it wanted to).  And, as discussed previously, 
the concept of overruling by implication is wholly incompatible with the 
“rule” expressed in Rodriguez de Quijas.185 
Fourth, the Casey Court instructs that it should consider “whether 
facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have 
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.”186  This is 
a difficult factor to apply with respect to Rodriguez de Quijas, for it does 
not appear that the Court’s concern that lower courts adhere to Supreme 
Court precedent was based on facts to begin with.187  If the precedent at 
issue in that case had been overruled by implication, the court of appeals’ 
failure to adhere to that precedent cannot be considered incorrect, mean-
ing there was no problem for the Supreme Court to address.  Though this 
criticism might be more of an argument as to why the Court’s statement 
in Rodriguez de Quijas is bad “law” as opposed to whether that “law” 
ought to be overruled, there also does not seem to be any factual im-
pediment to the overruling of the Court’s statement in that case. 
The final Casey factor “goes by various names, but might usefully, 
if imprecisely, be termed ‘judicial integrity.’”188  According to Professor 
Paulsen, the judicial integrity factor asks 
whether, even if a precedent is thought erroneous, it would seem ar-
bitrary, capricious, or fickle for the Court to be changing its mind 
too often or too readily (especially if its decisions change along with 
personnel changes) or to be changing its interpretation in response 
to public, or political, or even scholarly criticism or pressure.189 
Like the other Casey factors, this factor also weighs in favor of overrul-
ing, or at least does not stand in its way.  There would be nothing arbi-
trary, capricious, or fickle about overruling the Court’s statement in Rod-
riguez de Quijas (aside from the question as to why the decision took so 
long).  There would be no public outrage; indeed, one could confidently 
say that the public, as well as much of the bar, is oblivious to the exis-
                                                 
 184. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855. 
 185. See supra Part III.B.  Indeed, the very consideration of this factor seems to result in some-
thing of an acknowledgement of the concept of overruling by implication. 
 186. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855. 
 187. Professor Paulsen says the same thing with respect to the doctrine of stare decisis itself.  
See Paulson, supra note 160, at 1167. 
 188. Id. at 1198. 
 189. Id. 
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tence of this “rule.”  And though the Court perhaps could be seen as 
bowing to scholarly criticism, it would be for all of the right reasons. 
So should the Court expressly overrule its statement in Rodriguez 
de Quijas?  According to the Court’s own criteria, the answer is clearly 
yes.  Is the Supreme Court likely to ever engage in this analysis?  Almost 
certainly not.  To the contrary, the Court seems to relish having “the pre-
rogative of overruling its own decisions”190—which the Court seems to 
interpret as meaning the prerogative of expressly overruling its own deci-
sions, including decisions that have already been overruled by implica-
tion, decisions lower courts must follow only because the Court has said 
they must.  This is yet another reason why lower courts should simply 
ignore the Court’s statement in Rodriguez de Quijas, for not only are 
they more likely to reach correct results, but such an action is also more 
likely to provoke the reconsideration of this doctrine. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Case law interpretation and synthesis are at the core of the judicial 
process.191  In particular, courts have the ability—and must be given the 
opportunity—to determine when a superior court has overruled an earlier 
precedent and then to apply the overruling precedent.  This is true re-
gardless of whether the overruling was express or implied. 
Against this backdrop stands the Supreme Court’s statement in Ro-
driguez de Quijas commanding the lower courts to follow whichever of 
its decisions “directly controls,” so long as that decision has not been 
expressly overruled.  With all due respect to that body, this statement, 
which appears as dicta and contradicts the Court’s longstanding, and 
even necessary, practice of overruling by implication, may and must be 
ignored.  Rather than wait for the Court to expressly repudiate this state-
ment—something that does not seem likely to occur—lower courts must 
follow that precedent that fairly may be regarded as binding, even if, in 
some sense, that precedent might appear less “applicable” than some ear-
lier but now defunct precedent. 
                                                 
 190. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 
 191. See Kelman, supra note 18, at 12 (“Part of the required equipment of judges of all ranks is 
the ability to sift obiter from ratio, essential facts from inessential, and plausible from persuasive 
analogy.”). 
